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 FROM  : "QUESTION AND ANSWER 
SESSION" FOR ANGLO-JAPANESE 
   ECONOMICS & TRADES 
—BRITAIN IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
        INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
Shoko Okamoto
Assignment: 
1. What were the major problems faced by the British economy in the early 
   1920's? 
2. Outline briefly the main characteristics of unemployment in Britain be-
   tween the wars and explain why it was so severe. 
 3. Why was the International Depression of the 1930's so widespread and so 
   deep? 
 4. Account for the British financial crisis of 1931. 
 5. To what extent and why did the British economy recover from the 
   depression of the 1930's? 
 6. Outline and account for changes in the size of British companies since 1920. 
 7. What were the major economic problems faced by Britain in 1945?How 
   and to what extent had they been overcome by 1951? 
 8. Why did Britain experience full employment in the quarter century after 
   the Second World War? 
 9. Why, by international standards, was the British economic growth so slow 
   in the 1950's and 1960's? 
10. Discuss briefly the principal features of the Bretton Woods system and 
    account for its collapse in the early 1970's. 
11. Discuss the causes and consequences of the oil price explosion of 1973/74.
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 This material is a collection of some of the responses to a "Qu
estion and 
 Answer Session for Anglo--Japanese Economics & Trades" cond
ucted at the 
 University of Portsmouth on the occasion of my acceptance by th
e University 
 as a researching fellow.
 1. WHAT WERE THE MAJOR PROBLEMS FACED BY 
   THE BRITISH ECONOMY IN THE EARLY 1920's? 
The 1920's have been regarded as a period of stagnation as far as the 
British economy is concerned. Especially 1921, has been quoted as one 
of the worst years of depression since the industrial revolution . It was 
notable for its persistent high level of unemployment
, stagnation 
export and decline in the staple industries . 
During the war, the government had to finance its expenses through 
borrowing, and this was done by issuing Treasury Bill
, which inevi-
tably increased the fluid state of the economy. Many speculative 
activities occurred as banks were able to expand their credit creation 
and money could be borrowed easily from banks. A boom started to 
develop, demand for goods was stimulated, consumer expenditure 
rose, many companies and capital equipments were bought up and 
refloated at inflated prices. 
The boom came to an end in April 1920 when the Bank rate was raised 
to 7 %. As those speculative buying of capital equipment occurred 
mainly in the older industries like shipbuilding textile and engineer-
ing industries which used old techniques of production and did not 
have potential growth, these industries were left with heavy interest 
liabilities because of the higher interest rate. Price level had been
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 rising since supply could not meet demand in the short-run because 
 the production capacity was inefficient, and higher prices resulted is 
 higher wages which aggravated the supply position. 
 After the boom, the number of the unemployed rose to over 2 million. 
 The main feature of the employment was overdependent on the staple 
  industries. Since the war, most of Britain exports consisted of staple 
  products-like coal, ships, textiles. These industries accounted for not 
 less than 75% of employment share in the economy. World trade 
  recession in 1921 which resulted in the collapse of Britain export 
  market in some way contributed to the rapid increase in the level of 
  unemployment. 
  Exports which fell sharply in the early 1920's could be also attributed 
  to the changes in demand for British export. Britain had been pro-
  ducing high quality products since the pre-war period. And she 
  specialised in exporting staple products to primary producers or low-
  income countries instead of high-income elasticity products to richer 
  countries.  W  hen commodity prices fell which in turn affected the 
  incomes of the imported countries, these countries shifted their 
  demand to cheaper and low quality products supplied by, for example 
  countries like Japan and India. Also, at the end of 1920's, although 
  protectionism became prevalent all over the world, Japan, India, 
  Brazil, Italy, tried to invade the foreign market but protected their 
  domestic industries. The industrialization of new countries, led to 
  more supplies flowing in to the export market, thus resulting in 
  Britain's export market share becoming smaller. 
  In addition to the external factors mentioned above there were also 
  some internal factors which should be taken into account in explain-
  ing the decline in British staple industries which were also the
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exporting industries. British staple industries at that time were too 
old and too weak to compete overseas with the newly developed 
countries which adopted new technological changes . They faced the 
problems of reorganization. Ownership was fragmented , equipments 
were a motley assembly of new and old units poorly integrated with 
low productivity levels and high costs . This result was partly due to 
the strengthen of the trade unions . After the war, trade unions were 
more organised for wage negotiation . Between 1919 and 1920, weekly 
money wages were bid up , and rose further than the cost of living. 
The wage rate was pushed up further in real term by general reduc -
tion in working hours, as a result , unit labor cost rose rapidly and this 
large increase in wages could not be compensated for by increasing 
productivity or passing the costs on the final products especially after 
1920 when demand showed sign of decreasing . Even though wages 
fell sharply in 1921, real earning actually rose because of even greater 
fall in commodity prices and the cost of living . High costs and low 
productivity made British export uncompetitive in the world market . 
Another problem faced by the British economy was the repayment of 
the huge national debt left by the war . The method used by the 
government to finance the war was borrowing rather than ob-
taining money from the economy through taxation . This led to a 
substantial increase in national debt and the annual cost of servicing 
the debt was high due to the relative high rate of interest . Much of the 
borrowing consisted of short term floating debt which had an infla -
tionary effect in the economy . Several attempts were made to reduce 
the national debt by financing it as cheap as possible . This was to 
reduce the cost of servicing the national debt by conversion and 
funding at a lower rate of interest . Also this would serve to keep the
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 overall debt at its existing level. Since the government failed in the 
 first respec,t attention was drawn to the area where the goverment 
 could have more direct control, the restraint of public spending. The 
 deflationary budgetary policies were carried out to achieve a surplus 
 to pay off the national debt. Spending was cut and at the same time 
  taxes were raised, thus resulting in a fiscal year surplus. 
 Although the British economy experienced a boom in 1919-1920, it 
  was merely an artificial and a speculative one rather than a sub-
  stantial gain, which no doubt ended in disaster. This is well illustrated 
  by the British staple industries. During the boom those industries 
  were bought up with easy money created by government's borrowing 
  after the abandonment of gold standard and refloated at inflated 
  prices. Profits earned before the war were stuck in those second-hand 
  assets with no future potential for growth. When interest rate was 
  raised they were all heavily in debt. British exports were vulnerable 
  to the shifts in patterns of world demand. The cost structure 
  of the industries made the products uncompetitive in the world 
  market. Trade recession in 1921 was also a part of the reason why 
  British export was in a even worse situation. Inefficient and low 
 productity had always been a problem of the British industries. 
  High levels of unemployment showed no sign of significant recovery 
  in the early 20's. It was mainly because the power of trade unions after 
  the war push up money wages but commodity prices fell this, 
  together with a general reduction in the number of hours in the work 
  week resulted in an increase in real wages. It is doubtful that firms 
   would increase employment when demand conditions slackened. In 
  order to reduce the massive national debt left by the war, public 
  spending had to be cut. This undermined the growth of new indus-
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tries like motor cars and electrical industries when a reinvigoration of 
the economy was needed .
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2. OUTLINE BRIEFLY THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS 
  OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN BRITAIN BETWEEN THE 
  WARS AND EXPLAIN WHY IT WAS SO SEVERE .
Unemployment was a major problem for the British economy in the 
inter-war years. Immediately after the war Britain coped quite well 
with mobilized soldiers back into their peace time occupations. Un-
employment, at this time of great changes barely rose above the half 
million level. At this time there was even a mini-boom , brought about 
by increased consumer expenditure which rose 21% from 1918 to 1919. 
The boom collapsed in March 1921, and by the end of June the 
proportion of the labour force without work was (in the insured 
trades) 16-17%. The great depression of the 1930's brought the level 
of unemployment even worse than the 1920's-23% in August 1932. 
Not all areas of Britain were affected the same by unemployment . It 
was essentially regionalised. Prior to the war Britain's staple indus-
tries such as shipbuilding, coalmining , steel manufacturing and cotton 
were still expanding, but after the war there was a shift of resources 
away from the old staple industries into the new ones. Industries such 
as electrical engineering and motor car manufature were industries of 
the future. From 1924-29 the British steel industry was operating at 
half capacity, world shipbuilding had doubled but Britains was hardly
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growing. Coal lost out to other forms of energy and the cotton 
industry which accounted for 4 / 5 of output in 1914 lost many of its 
export markets. It was the heavily industrialised areas of Wales, the 
North East and The Clyde that suffered the most. Unemployment in 
Wales in 1932 was 2 / 3 higher than the national average. London and 
the South-East was relatively well off. 
The majority of job losses were borne by the unskilled labourers. The 
census of 1931 indicated that 30. 5% of unskilled labourers were with-
out work, and only 5 - 8 % of white collar workers were unemployed. 
It can also be said that the older a person was when he lost his job, the 
more difficulty it became for him in finding an alternative work. The 
same applies today, firms are reluctant to take on employees who are 
reaching the end of their working life. Unemployment was then 
somewhat age-structured. 
Towards the great depression of the 1930's unemployment was sho-
wing signs of becoming a long term problem for many people. In 1929, 
4. 7% of the labour force who registered for benefit had been unem-
ployed for over a year and this figure reached 16. 4% in 1932 and 
25.6% in 1936. 
The burden of unemployment between the wars was shared by many 
of the workforce particularly the unskilled. Its severity is attributed 
to many factors, some of which could have been avoided, possibly by 
reducing the level of unemployment. 
One such factor which accounted for this was the government's 
decision to return to the Gold Standard in 1925 at the pre-war parity 
of $ 4.86. Keynes said that this level was 10% too high and others such 
as Redmond said that against a basket of currencies, $ 4.86 may have 
been up to 20 or 25% too high. The effects of the currency over
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valuation were felt in the export market. The relative prices of UK 
exports increased and became uncompetitive , many of the exporters 
(particularly in the staple industries) were begun to loose the edge 
anyway so this came as a double blow to them. Government mone-
tary and fiscal policies were geared towards the Gold Standard, 
making any reversal in the unemployment trend even more difficult . 
The benefits given to persons without work may not hava helped the 
unemployment problem. Benefit was based on an insurance scheme 
where workers paid statutory contributions regularly in return for 
benefit at a time of unemployment. The scheme had 4 million con-
tributors in 1918 as opposed to 15. 4 million in 1938. The argument is 
that the higher the level of benefit the lower the opportunity cost is of 
being unemployed, when a family with two children were in 1930 
entitled to 50% of their normal wage as a benefit payment and 60% in 
1938. It can be seen that the figures for voluntary unemployment may 
have been quite higher. It may however, as in many cases, be true that 
even a payment of 60% of the working wage was not equal to the loss 
of pride, skill and self-respect that an unemployed person had to bare. 
There was obviously no shortage of labour , but there was a shortage 
of the correct type of labour in many of the new industries who also 
suffered unemployment towards the end of the period. The majority 
of the group of unemployed people were adult males who were skilled 
or were crafted e. g. shipbuilding. However the new industries did not 
require huge numbers of skilled craftsmen but needed semi-skilled 
workers, basically, the redundant workers from the old staple indus-
tries who were suffering from occupational immobility brought about 
by the shift in resources from the old to the new consequences. 
There was also a degree of geographical immobility e. g. mass un-
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 employment in the North East and Wales and the possibility of more 
 job opportunities in the Midlands and South East. People became tied 
 to one area and were reluctant to move and break social contacts. 
 Unfortunately for the new industries, there was not a great deal of 
 capital available to them as much of it was still tied up in the old fast-
 declining staple industries. The UK was also seen as a bad investment 
 area and capital that should have been invested in the UK went 
  overseas where better returns were expected. 
  Unemployment when viewed as a function of wages, rates, may have 
  risen due to the trade unions resistance to cut in real wages, a 
  resistance which eventually led to the General Strike in 1926. It is 
  however fair to say that a fall in real wages would not have vastly 
  reduced unemployment because the competition the UK faced from 
  Japan, China and the Near East (particularly in textiles) was just too 
  intense. Wage rates there were a fraction of UK rates and trade 
  barriers or changes in the rate of exchange may have been used to 
  prevent advantage through cost reductions. 
  Inflation during World War I fuelled strict government monetary 
  policy and monetary restrictions in 1920. These deflationary policies 
  cannot be blamed directly for the level of unemployment of around 
  15% in 1921-22 but they were certainly a contributing factor. 
  Despite the fact that from 1924-1937, GDP in real terms was increasing 
  at between 2 and 2.4% per annum and from 1920-1937, industrial 
  production was increasing at 3.1% per annum, unemployment was 
  still as big a problem as ever. Over the period from 1924 to 1933 
  shipbuilding recorded 37.4% out of work, even the so called "new" 
  industries had (over the same period) unemployment levels of nearly 
8 %.
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Although the boom of 1919-1921 was fairly small in UK
, the country 
faired better than most other countries in the 1929-32 depression
, but 
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3. WHY WAS THE INTERNATIONAL DEPRESSION 
  THE 1930'S SO WIDESPREAD AND SO DEEP?
OF
Between the First World War and the "Great Depression" the world 
saw a period of short but a rapid unprecedented economic progress 
(the so-called roaring twenties). By 1925 all major countries of the 
world had returned to the gold standard, with exception of France. 
Between 1925 and 1929 world production of primary products rose by 
11%., and world trade rose about 20%. 
But the world economic situation in the twenties was not stable. The 
world war had meant that the traditional economic structure had 
been altered resulting in a strain of production and trade. Some of the 
problems were solved after the war, but others were too large to be 
solved by market forces and half-hearted government interference. 
These problems could have been covered up by international credits 
were concealed for a short time by the prosperity of the decade. But 
they re-emerged after 1929 and became part of the cause of the great 
depression.
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 One of the problems was over-production in some areas of world 
 agriculture. The surplus in productive capacity of the large primary 
 producing countries and the tendency for agricultural prices to fall 
 relatively to those of manufactured goods, benefited the industrial 
 countries: it stimulated their industrial output and led to rapid rise in 
 their standard of living. But the export trades of the manufacturing 
 counties suffered because a smaller volume of their goods could be 
 bought in exchange for a given weight of primary products. The fall 
 in agricultural prices resumed its course after the unusually large 
  harvest in 1928, and it was one of the contributing factors in the world 
  depression, because it upset the balance of payment of the primary 
  producing countries, forcing them to protect their currencies which 
  led some of the industrial countries to protect their domestic agri-
  culture by tariff and their balance of payment by exchange control or 
  devaluation. 
  Another problem was a change in international specialization. The 
  war meant an end to the process by which the advanced industrial 
  countries of Europe, under the leadership of Great Britain, had in-
  vested vast amounts in territories overseas for the production of their 
  food and raw material supplies. During the war secondary industies 
  had been developed in all the overseas primary producing countries, 
  stimulated by the need to replace imports from Europe. After the war 
  this trend continued. 
  New power resources and mechanization reinforced the tendency 
  towards the localization of consumer's googs industries near their 
  markets rather than near the supply of basic raw materials. These 
  long-term trends largely account for the economic nationalism of the 
  new non-European territories and the difficulties of the export trades
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of the European industrial countries after the war. But also the peace 
treaties which had multiplied national frontiers and broken up larger 
economic units had an influence. These new nationals were all eager 
to build up their own industries in order to be as selfsufficient as 
possible by expanding exports and raising tariff barriers. 
The third and probably most important cause of the economic insta-
bility before 1929 was the war debts and reparations. The USA had 
replaced Great Britain as the leading creditor nation, and was owed 
$ 12-14 billion at the end of the war. The reparations the Germans 
were to pay the victors, for having started and lost the war , were 
huge, and the repayment of this enormous international debt could 
only have been paid back in the form of goods. This involved a 
profound alternation in the direction of world trade and profound 
changes in the internal economic structure especially in the USA , and 
made Germany an economic giant. But such a change was not 
completed, because, in the USA, tariff was closely bound up with the 
internal political situation and guarded by powerful vested interests. 
The only alternative to accepting repayment was to relend the money 
to the European debtors. The debt distorted the international economy 
and made it vulnerable to depression. The amount borrowed were 
too large, the borrower's economies became highly unstable, and a 
large proportion of the borrowing was short term capital which was 
highly volatile. The post-war inflations which occured in most 
counties worldwide made most decision-makers want their countries 
to restore the gold standard, and it was restored in a lot of countries. 
But the gold standard broke down during the depression partly 
because of the way in which it had been restored in the 1920s. Whereas 
its predecessor had operated under conditions of equilibrium , the post-
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 war gold standard was restored when economies were fundamentally 
 imbalance. The "new"gold standard did not provide stability, but was 
 itself a source of instability. 
 It has often been said that it was not the Great Wall Street Crash of 
 1929 which caused the great Depression in the 1930s, but the measures 
 and policies governments chose to deal with it. Perhaps this is a 
 correct interpretation, especially in light of the evidence from the 1987 
  Stock Market Crash. This recent event saw the Dow Jones index fall 
  nearly 23%-more than it dropped during the Great Crash of 1929-and 
  yet the world has not experienced the severe economic repercussions 
  such as widespread unemployment  which characterized the Great 
  Depression. Some scholars attribute the difference between the 
  events of 1929 and 1987 to the so called "wise" measures taken after the 
  1987 market crash. Economists and politicians now know that a 
  financial slump need not result in economic recession if the govern-
  ments have the vision to act collectively in their common interest and 
  adopt the right policies. The origins of the worldwide slump of 1929-
  32 must be located in the USA. The industrial production of the USA, 
  in 1929, represented 46% of the total industrial production of the 24 
  most important producers in the world. Consequently, any downturn 
  in the economy of the USA would have serious repercussions on the 
  rest of the world. Four major mistakes were made which turned 
  financial slump into economic depression, bringing misery to millions 
  across the industrialized world by throwing them out of work. 
    1) In order to control the stock exchange boom the Federal Re-
      serve in the USA tightened credit. The result was a succession of 
      bank failures and bankruptcies. 
    2) The US Congress passed the Hawley-Smoot tariffs in 1930, which
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 considerably increased tarriffs on imports. This led to an imme-
  diate retaliation by foreign governments, and made matters even 
  worse for. some European nations. 
3) President Hoover decided he had to balance the budget by 
 raising taxes, in June 1932, and cutting public spending even 
 though economic demand was slumping in the wake of falling 
 share prices. The consequence was to make recession inevitable . 
4) The world's leaders could not muster even a semblance of a 
 coordinated international response to the crisis. Britain was a 
 fading giant and the USA was not ready to take over the world 
 leadership, so everybody went their own way. This abdiction of 
 responsibility on the part of the great powers helps to explain the 
 depth and intensive of the crisis.
One of the most important factors deepening the depression was the 
collapse of prices of raw materials . Between 1929 and 1933, the world 
price of foodstuffs fell by 55%, and raw materials by 60%-a much 
sharper fall than in the prices of manufactured products . Farm 
incomes ceased to rise after 1925, as increasing world supplies caused 
downward presures on the prices of most agricultural products . As a 
result of the depression, the total value of the world trade fell by 19% 
in 1930. The depression did not originate in the primary producing 
sector, the agricultural countries were rather a victim of declining 
industrial incomes, increasing trade restrictions and their own latent 
instability. 
Before Keynes's ideas became widespread it was believed that a 
government should not spend more then it received in revenue and, if 
possible, should earn surplus to help pay off any outstanding debt . 
But during a depression tax revenue falls , and if unemployment
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 benefit schemes are in operation, expenditure on them increase. The 
 orthodox economists claimed that it was impossible for governments 
 to create work, because job-creating schemes only would rob other 
 sectors of investment that could have been more productive. They 
 hoped that recovery would come from a reduction in costs which 
 would lead to an increase in profits, more competitive exports and 
 consequently to an expansion in production. The element of cost 
  most under attack was wages, and many economists believed that if 
  workers were willing to work at a low-enough wage, their employers 
  could afford to give all of them jobs. The unemployed were, therefore, 
  victims of their own reluctance, especially through their trade unions, 
  to accept wage cuts. It was not until the rate 1930s that keynesian 
  economists were able to demonstrate that reduction in many wages 
  could lead to a reduction in consumption and ultimately more un-
  employment. But during the depression years it was a popular view 
  that wages, which naturally rose during a boom, should fall during an 
  enclosing slump. 
  Economic policy during the depression was, as we have seen, a com-
  bination of devaluation, exchange control, default on debts, import 
  substitution and tariff increases. The combination of these elements 
  made it almost impossible to attract capital and consequently exports 
  faded. It was rearmament and war which finally set the wheels of 
  industry turning.
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4. ACCOUNT FOR THE BRITISH FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 
  1931.
In 1930 and 1931, the world was experiencing a recession , due mainly 
to the Wall Street crash of 1929. The 1920's were seen as a period for 
growth, and as a result, there was great optimism about the future , 
but unfortunately the dreams of many were only shattered illusions . 
Britain's depression was only modest . Incomes were rising and so was 
the standard of living, and if it hadn't been for high unemployment 
and the departure from the Gold Standard in September 1931, there 
probably wouldn't have been a financial crisis at all. 
The crucial factor about Britain's economy at this time was that it 
suffered high export vulnerability. There was a dependence on staple 
products and markets of primary producing countries, where , in the 
1930's, income weren't buoyant . As incomes went down, so did prices 
and therefore demand for British goods weakened . Britain relied on 
the fact that 40% of goods exported went into these markets , but this 
wasn't the case as the U. S. accelerated deflationary policies . 
The Wall Street crash was caused by a tightening of policies in-
volving credit. In the 1920's there was excessive speculation in finan-
cial circles, and many businesses, both personal and industrial , were 
agreed on credit. When the policy was controlled , most people sold 
their stocks and there was the crash . United States import demand 
fell sharply and this served to depress prices and incomes in the 
primary producing exporting countries, who then proceeded to suffer 
Balance of Payments problems which reduced their ability to import
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 from industrial countries including Britain. America called back 
 many of the loans and this proved to be the catalyst of the financial 
 crisis as far as Britain was concerned. 
 Before the suspension of gold convertibility the authorities, especially 
 the Bank of England, sold over £ 200 million of owned or borrowed 
  gold and foreign exchange in their attempt to defend the parity of 
  $ 4.86 because it was the maintenance of this which they saw as their 
  main economic policy. 
  In the 1920's, foreigners, spurred on by high returns, increased their 
  sterling balance. As a result the Bank of England saw its gold and 
  hidden foreign exchange reserves rise in 14 of the 19 quarters between 
  March 1925 and December 1929. In 1930/31 the proto-overseas sterling 
  area countries were themselves in severe balance of payment diffi-
  culties and were reducing their sterling balance, which, when trans-
  ferred to foreigners were often taken from London in gold. In addition 
  to this, the French Government was drawing on its large London 
  funds to meet a budget deficit. French banks were drawing down 
   their sterling secondary reserves to increase their cash reserves and 
  allow for deposit and currency expansion and as interest rates fell to 
  low levels, foreigners often anticipating liquidity problems at home, 
   found it prudent either to reduce their sterling balances or, at best, not 
   to increase them. The result was that Britain, without any abnormal 
   international events, faced a substantial balance of payments problem 
   in 1931. 
   To meet the deficit, the Bank of England had reserves of roughly 
£ 150 million plus an exchange reserve of £ 30 million, although not 
   all was available for exchange defence, £ 100 million was needed to 
   cover the domestic note issue.
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 A choice that the Bank had was to borrow from other cent
ral banks as 
 it had before but these banks were becoming less willing t
o lend, and 
 although there wasn't much choice , the Bank. of England was less 
 willing to borrow. The decision was taken by the governme
nt in the 
 spring to deflate the economy . Reflation, devaluation and protection 
 were all dismissed as politically difficult , therefore deflationary pol-
 icies were assumed by a process of elimination
, even though unem-
 ployment at the time exceeded 20%. 
 Throughout the spring of 1931, the labour government stalled, speak-
 ing of future disasters while merely attempting to hold the existi
ng 
 position until the autumn, thus Montagu Norman , the Governor of the 
Bank of England, said "The future here depends more on politi
cs than 
on finance." That was still the position when Britain's difficulti
es were 
compounded by an international liquidity crisis . The beginning of 
pressure on international liquidity really began in the late 192O's when 
primary producing countries were faced with falling prices and in -
comes due to over - production and stock piling . These countries 
became debtors and were faced with large payments deficits and 
an 
outflow of funds , therefore many, including Canada , Australia and 
New Zealand were forced to leave the Gold Standard and de
value 
their currencies. 
The deflationary process , exacerbated by the world recession and the 
Wall Street crash, led to many institutional weaknesses as a wave of 
bank failures spread across both the U . S. and Europe. 
The banking crisis, which led to 2, 000 banks in the U. S. collapsing in 
eighteen months soon spread to Europe . The crisis began with the 
announcement of the difficulties of the Credit Anstalt of Vienna 
on 11 
May, which partially resulted from politically inspired French with -
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 drawals. They had found some of their supposedly liquid assets 
frozen, so tired to improve their positions by recalling funds from 
 other banks or financial centres, starting with those most likely to be 
 in future difficulty. This move quickly spread to London as the 
  premier money market in Europe, because Dutch, Belgian, French and 
  Swiss banks kept most of their liquid reserves there and would want 
  them for their own funding. This came at a time when fresh inflows 
  of funds were needed to finance balance of payments deficit. 
  Between June 1930 and December 1931, London lost £ 350 million of 
  foreign funds and this outflow reached panic proportions in the 
  summer of 1931 when approximately £ 200 million left the country. 
  The rapid rate of withdrawal and the continental financial panic 
  diminished Britain's ability to sustain her external payments and 
  therefore her ability to remain solvent. With the unfavourable short 
  term liquidity position, there seemed little else to do but to release the 
  sterling parity and so on 21 September, 1931. Britain finally abandoned 
  the gold standard and devalued her currency. 
  It had become apparent that London could not withstand the strain 
  for long without soon depleting reserves by realizing her short term 
   assets, and the alternatives presented problems. Devaluation, how-
  ever distasteful to the authorities, was preferable to further doses of 
   domestic deflation. 
   At the bottom of Britain's 1931 difficulties lay a weakened interna-
   tional financial position and a large payments deficit, both of which 
   stemmed from previous policy decisions and the current economic 
   conditions. Many of Britain's short term assets abroad were rendered 
   difficult to resolve owing to the fact that many were locked up in 
   European financial centres which were themselves in a non-liquid
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 state. 
 It was the inability to either retain previously invested funds i
n 
 London or to attract further investment by foreigners that was the 
 root cause of London's short term difficulties . 
 The report of the May Committee which was commissioned b
y the 
 government, did not help the financial situation of 1931 when they 
 "paint
ed the budgetary picture in the blackest possible terms and 
 recommended large, politically impossible cuts in unemployment ex-
 penditure." It was this report that the labour government had been 
 waiting for in the spring , hoping that they might encourage invest-
 ment, but this was not to be the case, and Britain plunged into the 
 world financial crisis of 1931. 
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 5. TO WHAT EXTENT AND WHY DID THE BRITISH 
   ECONOMY RECOVER FROM THE DEPRESSION OF 
   THE 1930'S? 
The financial crisis of 1931, compounded by the depressed state of 
economic activity from 1929 together resulted in a depression of the 
severest intensity. Recovery from such a trough was therefore in-
evitable if only on the rebound. Throughout the whole economy, 
there were high unemployment levels and high wage rates together 
with a lack of business confidence. Desperately needed was an 
increase in Aggregate Demand in the home market and in especially
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 foreign markets. Government action was therfore needed if not to 
 directly attack any particular problem, but to at least set the stage for 
  an economic upturn. 
 By September of 1931 with the Pound devalued to $ 3.40 and the Gold 
  Standard abandoned, conditions in the economy started to change. 
  The sterling had been devastatingly overvalued making British goods 
  uncompetitive on international markets. Now with a floating ex-
  change rate, the sterling could perhaps attain its true value re-
  sulting in increased exports. Despite a floating exchange rate, the 
  sterling remained overvalued by between four and five percent in 
  1934 and by 1937 was more overvalued then when on the Gold Sta-
  ndard. The effect of exchange rates becoming favourable to Britain 
  never surfaced and by 1933 exports going to countries outside the 
  sterling area were 37. 9% of total exports, compared with the 1929 
  figure of 43. 8%. 
  A change in policy by the National Government towards the sterling 
  was accompanied by a more active role to improve economic condi-
  tions. The situation could hardly have been worse. High unem-
  ployment rates were due to the decline in the traditional staple 
   exporting industries which were all centered in specific areas. There 
   was the cotton industry in North West England; coal mining in Wales; 
   shipbuilding, iron and steel in Scotland and the North East of Eng-
   land. Between 1929 and 1932 these industries had lost over 310, 000 
   jobs. Their decline and reducing exports went hand in hand and so 
   any increase in demand by the home market did not affect these 
   industries. Therefore by 1937 when the economy was burning these 
   industries still had 330, 000 less employees than in 1929. The coal 
   industry had lost export orders of 20 million tonnes between 1929and
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 1937 which accounted for the drop of 17.5 million tonnes in output. 
 The cotton industry was also in a poor state 
with only 75% of 
 spinning capacity being used and only 68% of we
aving capacity in 
 production. 
 Although recovery of the economy did take place it 
was concentrated 
 on the newer industries which had the potential for e
xpansion already 
 seen in the traditional industries. The electricity industry and the 
 manufacture of associated goods; motor vehicle m
anufacturing; the 
 aircraft industry; chemical industries and the constru
ction industry 
 were just some of those industries which shared u
nprecedented 
 growth throughout the recovery period. The demand for such goods 
centered on the salaried workforce which was based in th
e South East 
of England. Salaried workers were much less susceptibl
e to unem-
ployment which meant demand for the new commodities was elasti
c. 
The electricity industry increased supply to nearly 
nine million con-
sumers in 1939 as against only three million in 1929
, and even at the 
lowest point of depression employed over 100
,000 workers. The 
number of electrical engineers rose from 173
, 600 in 1924 to 367, 000 in 
1937. The motor industry supplied over half a million vehi
cles by 1937, 
a five fold increase in fourteen years. 
However due to increased mass production through inc
reasing tech-
nology, only 160, 000 jobs were created. Decreasing cost were enjoyed 
by many of these new industries which meant markets co
uld be 
expanded and output raised. The construction industry experienced a 
boom period with residential construction 40% higher in 1933 th
an in 
1929. The reduction of the mortgage rate from 6 to 4 % and th
e ability 
of contractors to obtain cheap credit stimulated the industry in 
a very 
positive way.
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 Cheap credit was very much a culmination of events starting with the 
 abandoning of the Gold Standard in 1931. Foreign money was no 
 longer needed to bolster the resources to find the Gold Standard and 
 so the bank rate was reduced from six to two percent. Interest rates 
 throughout the system fell, a situation which the government hoped 
 would increase private investment and thus reducing unemployment 
 and increasing production. With cheap interest rates the burden of 
 the National Debt reduced, enabling a balanced budget easier to 
 attain, because the interest on the National Debt was the single largest 
 payment paid by the Treasury. 
 The cheap money policy kept recovery going once prices began to rise 
 and by 1934 investment was back at the 1929 levels. The contribution 
 by the influx cheap money towards economic recovery had less 
 foundation than a fixed bank rate may have had. The main aim of 
 National Governments fiscal policy remained consistent with that of 
 previous government spending; however in 1931, government spend-
 ing was at an unprecedented level. Rapidly increasing unemployment 
 forced the Treasury to lend to the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
 whose deficit was £ 100 million by mid 1931. The Treasury therefore 
 showed that borrowing to pay benifits unbalanced budgets and was 
 the main factor behind the reductions in unemployment that follo-
 wed. Fiscal policy remained deflationary until 1933 at least when 
 rearmament began, and thus played little part in the recovery. 
 Government policy to induce recovery also changed in other areas. 
 Tariffs were introduced to protect industry from foreign competition. 
 Some industries, such as cotton and chemicals, benefited from pro-
 tection, while others suffered because of the increase in prices of the 
 imported raw materials. Tariffs as means of protecting industries
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were rather unsuccessful because the industries mainly in the decline 
suffered export losses when other countries retaliated their own tari-
ffs. During the period 1929 to 1936 regional government policies 
resulted in 270, 000 workes given advance wages and Layoff benefits 
to assist in finding new employment. Meanwhile, the South East and 
London, in particular, became increasingly congested due to the 
decline in industry and by 1937 radical changes in government policy 
were being called for. 
By 1937 there had been a definite recovery and the economy was 
booming. By mid summer the Board of Trade estimated that indus-
trial output was up 64% from 1932, even 30% above the peak level of 
1929. During the following twelve months, however, 10% dropped off 
this index in a crash half as bad as that between 1929 and 1932. 
Unemployment was still high at 8. 5% in 1937 despite the ongoing 
process of rearmament. Manufacturing growth between 1932 and 1937 
was unpredicted which was probably due to a combination of the 
effects of increased protection from tariffs and the short term effects 
of sterling depreciation. However. from 1935 the process of rearma-
ment greatly exaggerated this boom. The steel industry despite its 
uncompetitiveness actually increased production from eleven million 
tons in 1929 to fourteen million tons in 1939, as a result of rearmament. 
There had been rapid growth in economic activity in the 1939's after 
the trough of 1931. This growth did not spread equally throughout all 
the industries or the country, and so high levels of unemployment 
continued until the outbreak of the war. The new industries which 
emerged were capital rather than labour intensive and so the tradi-
tional industries continued to decline, and unemployment remained at 
high levels. Government policy helped to alter the problem of eco-
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 nomic slump through orthodoxy and innovation. For the salaried 
 worker the 1930's became an increasingly affluent time, but for the 
 ordinary worker unemployment and the fear of it remained a fact of 
 life.
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6. OUTLINE & ACCOUNT FOR CHANGES IN THE SIZE 
  OF BRITISH COMPANIES SINCE 1920.
Our indication of the size of British companies is usually measured 
using the concentration ratio. This is the share of the largest one 
hundred firms in the total sales or output of the economy. Other 
measures of size have also been used, such as profits, assets, market 
valuation of capital and the number of employees. 
In the late nineteenth and twentieth century, there were strong in-
ducement making for larger scale enterprise. During the First World 
War the Government planned, financed and directed the activities of 
manufacturing firms. Firms were induced to adopt the most eco-
nomical methods. This lead to some increased merger activity in 
order to expand capacity. However after the war the situation was far 
from that of prosperity; in fact Britain suffered a fierce slump. Ra-
tionalization was seen to be the solution to the problem experienced 
by the British economy, although Lyndall Urwich urged that: 
  The mere financial combination of businesses or the wider appli-
  cation of scientific methods of management to existing units of
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   control, can neither of them by themselves contribute effectively 
   towards equipping Great Britain with that reorganised national 
   economy which is essential if she is to retain her place among the 
   industrialised nations. 
 The failure of the market economy to produce prosperity and full 
 employment lead to call for very large scale merging of intersts. 
 The major changes in the size of British companies began in the 1920's, 
 with this period appearing as the first merger intensive decade, 
 corresponding to a period of increased shape of output accounted for 
 by the one hundred largest firms. Fig . 1 below, shows how the 
 concentration of British firms has increased. 
 FIG   1YEAR SHARE OF OUTPUT ACCOUNTED 
                      FOR BY 100 LARGEST FIRMS (in %)
Official policy towards mergers was at that time favourable; with 
them being considered as necessary in order to improve efficiency and 
ensure competitiveness abroad. In 1921 the Profiteering Act was 
abolished. It had up until then, made the earning of a profit which to , 
in view of all the circumstances unreasonable , a punishable offence. 
Now, this lead the way for firms to increase their control of the 
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 During the first half of this century, many smaller family firms coed 
 to larger quoted firms, thus decreasing the number of small firms. 
 The advantages of this were considered to be an increase in efficiency, 
 and increasing returns to capital. It was felt at the time that the 
 returns from economies of scale and monopoly could be maintained if 
 firms were prepared to consolidate their assets into larger units. Up to 
 1965, most capital gains were free from taxation and therefore most of 
 the proceeds from the sales of a firm went directly to the owners. 
 The growth of giant companies was usually the result of the pooling 
 of assets, .which had previously been controlled by many firms. 
 Reseach and development could be carried out on a much larger scale 
 by large companies; so increasing the size of firms was considered to 
 be beneficial to future technical progress, through the bringing to-
 gether of ideas from various sources. For large firms such projects laid 
 the basis for future corporate growth and diversification, adding 
  further to the pressures toward large firms. 
  The setting up of the Banker's Industrial Development company 
  (BIDC) in 1929 encouraged the formation of largest firms. It was 
  intended to devise schemes to re-equip and where necessary merger 
  companies in the staple industries which were suffering financial 
  problems. One large firm formed under the guidance of BIDC was the 
  Lancashire Cotton Corporation which between 1929 and 1932ab-
  sorbed almost one hundred firms. 
  The larger scale merger activity of the 1920's increased the rate of 
  growth of leading firms over a wide range of industry groups eg, 82% 
  of the growth in the food industry was due to mergers, the corre-
  sponding figures for Chemicals and Building materials being 91% and 
  93% respectively. All but three of fifteen industries showed mergers
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as being more important than internal growth in increasing the level 
of concentration. Fig. 2 shows the number of firms decreasing 
through mergers.










NO OF FIRMS DISAPPEARING THROUGH MERGERS .
Duringinter-war 
strongto have an effect on the imposition of a monopoly 
policy even the Labour 
proposals for the investigation 
welcomed as a sign of industrial vigour and only in the late thirties 
were doubts raised and popular opinion turned against schemes of 
rationalization which showed no regard for the public interest. 
Between 1930 and 1948 there was a decline in the share of the market 
held by the one hundred largest firms from 66% to 57%. Declines were 
shown in thirteen out of seventeen industries with the increases in the 
others being very small. Expenditure on mergers fell to half its 1920's 
value in the thirties and fell further in the 1940's. There was a decrease 
in the numbers of small firms (employing less than two hundred 
peoples), from 38% of total employment and 35% of total output in 
1935 to 24% and 20% respectively in 1958. Evidence of increased 
concentration outside manufacturing is however less satisfactory , 
although, for grocery retailing in particulars the concentration has 
dramatically increased.
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 From the 1940's goverment interest in merger activity increased and 
 many policies were implimented after this date. The rise to power of 
 the Labour Party brought about the monopolies and restrictive prac-
 tices commission's formation in 1948. Following the reports of the 
 commission, mergers no longer received such strong support. In 1956 
 the conservative government established the Restrictive Practice's 
 Court to act as a futher deterrent. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
 assumed that restrictive practices were harmful until proven other-
  wise, and the court found that only 1 % of the agreements registered 
  were in fact in the public's interest. The act was successful in 
  increasing competition in a significant number of. industries. 
  Competition was also increased by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
  and Trade (GATT), as barriers were reduced, an influx of capital into 
  the UK economy from overseas lead to increased competition, al-
  though merger activity offset this to certain extent. 
  The 1948 Companies act made takeover bids much easier as firms were 
  forced to disclose more details of their assets and profits. This added 
  to the ways in which firms could become larger. Bids could now be 
  made directly to the shareholders instead of via the directors of the 
  firm. In the fifteen years after 1948 a quarter of quoted companies 
  were acquired by other quoted companies. This figure rose to thirty - 
  eight per cent between 1957 and 1967. 
  There were two important requirements on movement towards 
  higher concentration which were removed in the fifties. They were 
  the absence of strong competitive firms and restrains on takeover 
  bids. The government was moving way from policies of non--inter-
  vention, in merger activity. The policy of intervention in private 
  industries were further increased by the labour government of 1964-
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 1970. Previous fears that mergers could create unemployment had 
been dropped and replaced with the theory that larger units would in 
the long run be beneficial to future employment. 
Internal growth has played a more important part in the increase in 
the size of firms in recent years. This is the growth due to investment 
in new factories etc. In recent rears it has become more predominant 
as there is now a greater emphasis on ploughing profits back into the 
firm, rather than removing them. Now capital issues also increased 
the size of firms. The stock market offererd this facility and it was 
particularly useful to companies which did't have the cash flow to 
finance large investments since without this facility they could not 
easily have gained access to scale economies. 
Diversification increased throughout the 1960's with 45% of compa-
nies being diversified in 1960. This figure rose to 60% by 1930. Much 
of this diversification seems to have been the result of earlier mergers. 
Between 1957 and 1968, 39% of acquisitions by quoted firms were of 
firms from other industries. Many firms also expanded through the 
acquisition of overseas subsidiaries. In 1950 only 29% of large firms 
held overseas subsidiaries. By 1970 this figure had risen to 58%. 
Merger activity remained relatively high in the 1970's, but after the oil 
crisis of 1973 and with a sluggish stock market, the number of mergers 
declined, accounting for a smaller proportion of total investment 
expenditure than had occured during recent decades. In 1973 the Fair 
Trade Act redefined monopoly as occurring when a firm controls 25% 
of the market (it had previously been a third) was enacted. This lead 
to more mergers being reported to the commission, and the share of 
the market controlled by the one hundred largest firms remaining 
fairly consistent.
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 Improved technology and the wider use of computers has made the 
 management of large firms much easier in recent years. Conse-
 quently, firms can become much larger before problems arise with 
 administration etc. 
 In conclusion it appears that there has been a long term tendency for 
 the concentration of UK firms in the merket. This rate of increase has 
 accelerated in proportionate terms since the end of the war. The rate 
 of increase for 1950-70 being double that of 1901-1935. Important 
 factors in recent years being changes in personal and company tax-
 ation, the distribution of personal wealth. The operations of insurance 
  and pension companies have also played an important part in the 
 change in the size of UK companies. They direct the publics savings 
  into large quoted companies. The market for industrial capital has 
  therefore favoured large quoted companies, and brought about lower 
  capital costs encouraging the creation of large financial units, by 
  means of mergers etc.
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7. WHAT WERE THE MAJOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
  FACED BY BRITAIN IN 1945? HOW AND TO WHAT 
  EXTENT HAD THEY BEEN OVERCOME BY 1951? 
After the end of the war in Europe a general election was called almost 
immediately afterwards. The election returned a Labour government 
to power with clearly an overwhelming majority.
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 The Labour government of 1945 was in a way the delayed results of 
 the bitter experiences of the interwar years. Labour's ideology was 
 based on J. M. Keynes' radical ideas, but many of the policy changes, 
 which took place under this governments, were no revolutionary at 
 all but were to a certain degree, based on the preparatory work 
 initiated during the war. 
 The national disasters and sharing of hardships during the war had 
 created a new spirit of national consciousness which made a new 
 approach to the country's future a necessity. In order to meet the 
 demands from the trade unions the Churchill Coalition Government 
 worked out plans for postwar social security; and full employment. 
 Plans for unscrambling the war machine and for international rela-
 tions were also prepared. 
 Keynes was the mastermind behind a treasury submitted proposal for 
 the establishment of an International Clearing Union for discussion at 
 the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 in the USA . The aggreement 
 resulting from this conference led to the establishment of the Inter-
 national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Re-
 construction and Development (IBRD) . 
 Bank Rate was held steady at 2 % during the war and this policy , 
 combined with direction of labour , and other physical controls, a 
 saving campaign, became successful. Investment declined and the net 
 additions to the capital stock were negative but most losses on the 
domestic side were made good in a couple of years after the war. 
 The most serious economic problems the new Labour Government 
was confronted with occurred on the financial side. During the war 
Britain had been transformed from the world's largest creditor to the 
world's largest debtor.
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The country had for years lived beyond means by consuming its 
capital, by borrowing and on gifts from abroad. Another problem was 
the disruption and diversion of the British productive capacity, and in 
the immediate postwar years the primary need was to replenish the 
devastated stock of capital assets and raw materials. But in order to 
restore its economy Britain had, it was estimated, to raise her exports 
to 75% above the prewar level. The balance of payments was seen, 
therefore, as the central problem of the economy, and the core of this 
problem was the shortage of hard currency resulting in the so-called 
dollar gap. The situation was aggravated by the large accumulation 
of purchasing power. Consumers emerged from the war years with 
substantial money balance which they had been prevented from 
spending, thus creating a dangerous inflatory potential. 
Dalton, the new Chancellor of Exchequer, introduced aimost imme-
diately a policy of still, cheaper money, which separately and also 
alongside with continuing physical controls like building licences and 
control on imports. But the accumulated purchasing power combined 
with the government's policy of forcing down interest rates could not, 
due to price controls, be used by consumers to bid up prices and so 
attract resources into the promotion of the most desired commodities. 
Instead resources went into the production of goods of secondary 
 attractiveness where prices were not controlled raising the overall 
 cost and therefore the prices of British exports. 
 The problems with the balance of payment became really acute and 
 gold and dollar reserves were rapidly exhausted in spite of restrictions 
 on imports. Only the USA had the necessary productive capacity to 
 make good the losses experienced by other countries. In 1946, in order 
 to alleviate the shortage of dollars, the USA and Canada made sub-
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 stantial loans including 1, 000 million to Britain. It was expected that 
 these loans would be sufficient to cover requirements over the short 
 period which was all that was expected and seen necessary for the 
 world economies to recover. But in 1947 the situation deteriorated. It 
 was officially admitted that the loan was drawn on much more 
 rapidly than was safe and on top of that came, in March, coal was 
 reckoned to have cost the country about 200 million in exports
. In 
 July the sterling became convertible but that lasted for only few 
 weeks because the size of the dollar deficit increased immediately. 
 In 1948 a general liquidity crisis was only avoided by further loans 
 made under the European Recovery Programme, through which Brit-
 ain received loans amounting to 1, 500 million between 1948 and 1950. 
 The programme was called Marshall Aid , after the American Secre-
 tary of State, General Marshall . The loans were allocated under the 
directon of Organisation for European Economic Coorperation 
 (OEEC). Without this aid the prospects for British economy would 
have been very bleak. 
Despite the periodic crisis the overall performance of the Britsh eco-
nomy, the period after 1945, was quite impressive. There was a strong 
and steady expansion in output and exports, while controls kept 
inflation and consumption in check and employment remained high. 
Exports grew at and average rate of 11. 9% a year between 1946 and 
1951, while industrial production grew 5. 75% on average. GDP rose 
only by 2. 5% a year, largely because the service sector was held back. 
Unemployment fell from 3. 1% in 1947 to 1. 2% by 1951. The balance of 
payment, boosted by the Marshall Aid, showed signs of stability by 
1950. But in the latter part of the period there were signs that other 
countries were beginning to pull ahead of Britain .
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 Britain continued to concentrate on the markets of the sterling area 
 (the former Empire) because it was found easier to push exports to 
 these markets than to North America and Western Europe, but, un-
 fortunately, it was not here that the valuable dollars, so much needed 
 to improve the balance of payment, were found. Britain had it within 
 its grasp to participate in the reshaping of Europe and its recovery, 
 but the country missed the opportunity and failed to participate in the 
  trade boom within Western Europe between 1948-1951. 
  Labour Government laid the foundations for the Welfare State, but 
  was unable to give a new sense of purpose and direction on economic 
  matters to the British public. Britain, the first of all "developed" 
  economies, found it hard to think in the terms which came so natu-
  rally to backward nations trying to catch up with advanced ones and 
  consequently little was done to show how growth, productivity, tec-
  hnological change and the need to export could contribute to real 
  income gains and economic wall-being of the country.
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8. WHY DID BRITAIN EXPERIENCE FULL EMPLOY-
  MENT IN THE QUARTER CENTURY AFTER THE 
  SECOND WORLD WAR?
If the inter war years were characterised by mass unemployment, the 
post war years were marked by a sharp reversal in employment 
trends to the extent that labour was brought from abroad to satisfy
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 the demand. 
 Between 1952-73 the number of people in civilian employment rose by 
 29%. Lord Beveridge had assumed an unemployment rate of 8.5%, 
 but in 1944 stated that 3 % was a reasonable definition of full em-
 ployment. Britain's unemployment level remained below 3 % for 
 almost 25 years and remained below one million . 
 The popular explanation for the dramatic turn about in unemploy-
 ment between the interwar and post war period is the implementation 
 of the Keynesian demand management policies. This identified the 
 main problem of the 1930's as demand deficiency . This restricted 
 consumption and in turn production , exports and employment were 
 promoted. Demand management relied on the government to increase 
 the demand in the economy by increased spending which , through the 
 multiple effect would increase general activity in the economy and 
 this rectify output and employment problems. 
 There is little doubt that in the post war years there was an increase 
 in demand in the economy. R. C. Matthews questions the govern-
 ments role in this process as to "whether the high level of demand that 
 actually occured was due to government, action or whether it was due 
to other forces as a result of which government action was not 
 needed." 
Matthews argues that government policy was, if anything, having a 
restraining effect on the economy. This is because there was a 
government surplus of 3 % (average per annum) and so rather than 
increasing demand by borrowing the governments surplus created a 
deflationary pressure. The success of the post war period according to 
Matthews was the level of investment and export increases. 
There was an increase both in the demand for, and willingness to
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 supply as well as investment. Demand was caused by the recon-
 struction and reallocation of resources lost in the war effort, the 
 neglect of investment during the war years and indeed during the 
 slump of the 1930's. 
 Coupled with the demand for investment was the increase in supply. 
  There was a change in entrepreneurial attitudes caused by the feeling 
  that the government would support demand if a slump occurred. 
  Money was relatively cheap as interest rates were low and there were 
  tax incentives to invest. There was an inflation rate of approximately 
  4 % which was perceived as being good for business and demand was 
  supported by inflexible wages in downward direction. 
  Thus investment levels were very high during this period. Inevitably 
  employment levels increased. A good example was the house building 
  industry which employed many people. Matthews argues that in-
  vestment during this period was increasingly concentrated private 
  sector (although both public and private were increasing). There 
  was very fast growth of capital stock which was low immediately 
  after the war with investment ratios averaged at 12. 9% between  1950--
  70 (compared with 5. 6% 1928-38). Investment returns too were high 
  averaging 13% per annum. This investment thus created increasing 
  activity in the economy and employment increased. 
  Technical advances were also made during this period. New capital 
  was often far superior to pre-war capital. New efficient machines 
  made productivity per worker increasingly higher and made workers 
  a more attractive commodity. Coupled with this was an increase in 
   the efficiency of the allocation of resources, further aiding produc-
   tivity. 
   Exports also increased in this period. This was aided by a massive




  EXPORTS 
  1913 91 
  1929 74 
  1933 59 
  1950 91 
  1958 100 
  1960 109 
  1970 170
30.5% in 1949 due to an American recession . 





            Source : Gower "Key Economic Statistics 1900-66" 
The growth in the economy was the great . Production increased in 
the advanced capitalist countries to levels 180% higher than the 1930's. 
Output per head increased . The economy grew at a rate of nearly 3 % 
per annum between 1950-70. Armstrong wrote , "The fifties and sixties 
were capitalisms golden age. 1" Immediately after the war there was 
increased spending power as people had savings from the war . 
Youngson argues that these things helped to create a boom to rectify 
the war years and after that was completed there was a largely self -
propelling maintenance of high levels of activity. 
The increased demand wasn't solely British phenomena . Throughout 
Europe the general level of trade and growth occured . Thus Britain 
was helped substantially by a general world boom . This was helped 
by better marking relations created by Bretton woods , Gatt and later 
the E. E. C., who all worked towards lowering the barriers to trade . 
There were no reflections or war debts between any of the war 
countries which hindered growth after the first world war and 
America's Marshall and assisted the upturn in international trade . 
Wiedleburger suggests employment levels were determined largely
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 by the Two Sector move up of the economy. There was a shift from 
 the Agricultural sector, where marginal product is near 0 and wages 
 are barely above subsistance levels, to the industrial (and particularly 
 manufacturing sector). Here people were drawn into the latter by pay 
 above subsistance levels but replace the marginal product. Thus 
 profit was increased and the demand for labour increased. This 
 theory has been criticised as it does not seem to hold true for the 1920' 
  s and 1930's. 
 Thus it is difficult to say conclusively that any one factor was solely 
  responsible for employment levels in the post war period. Most would 
  agree that it was probably a combination of many of the aforemen-
  tioned factors, which increased the levels of activity and through 
  multiple processes the level of employment.
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9. WHY, BY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, WAS THE 
  BRITISH ECONOMIC GROWTH SO SLOW IN THE 
   1950'S AND 1960'S?
In historical terms many of Britain's growth statistics were impressive 
after 1945. Between 1945 and 1950 industrial production increased by 
30-40% and the rate of real growth in total industrial output increased 
by 3.7% between 1945 and 1960. Britain's international trade per-
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formance improved dramatically; with visible exports increased by 
75% over pre-war levels, and no increase in imports. However, these 
figures are depressing when compared with the achievements of other 
countries, expecially the founder members of the E. E. C., Japan and 
the partners of the European Free Trade Association (E . F. T. A. ). 
Britain had internal constraints which inhibited economic growth and 
modernisation on the same scale as those of other countries. There 
was inefficient organisation of industry , dated capital, a low level of 
capital goods replacement, widespread trades union power and 
general mismanagement. The external constraints related to Britain's 
vulnerable financial system, which in itself was a function of limited 
resources, unfavourable balance of payments and Britain's financial 
and economic commitments, such as her involvement in the Suez and 
with the Colonies. 
The Government was largely to blame for the economic decline in the 
1950's and 1960's. To achieve traditional goals, foremost prestige, the 
government sacrificed the economy mainly by protecting the most 
cherished symbol of Britain's international position-the value of the 
Sterling. Expensive British goods were no attractive to foreign 
markets, which probably produce superior quality ones themselves. 
By the end of the 1950's a vicious cycle had evolved where the effort of 
maintaining Britain's international position had become the cause of 
here international vulnerability . The Government made few attempts 
to enhance trade; the Foreign office did not have the economic ex-
pertise and the Board of Trade at the time played a far less central role 
in the international economy. Twice in the post-war years were 
special government offices opened to deal with the domestic economy, 
the first being the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1947 under Cripps
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 and the second being the Department of economic Affairs in 1964 with 
 George Brown as the Minister in charge. In both cases the Treasury 
 re-asserted its traditional control over the entire scope of the domestic 
 economy within a short while. 
Investement in Britain was low due to the whole panoply of govern-
 ment power, mainly exercised by the Treasury, which was keen to 
 keep it that way. The Treasury was obsessed with the balance of 
  payments, a balanced budget, the external value of sterling and 
  inflation, but certainly not industry. Hence the Treasury was ob-
 structive to investment in industry as it had always been wedded to a 
  narrow segment of the economy - foreign exchange and currency 
  balance. The strain of single-faceted responsibility, but multi-faceted 
  power, led unsurprisingly to the Treasury putting its own interest 
  first over the long-term interest of the country. Also, the traditional 
  job of the Treasury was to minimise the expenditure of other gov-
  ernment departments, expenditure being seen as the ultimate evil. It 
  must be mentioned that many of the treasury employees were un-
  prepared for the task of administrating a complex economy, most 
  having had a training in the Classics. Also the tradition of reposting 
  people to new positions every two or three year did no provide a basis 
  of stability. 
  The Treasury, therefore, ignored the cries of the industries whilst 
  listening to those of the banks and, inparticular, the Bank of England. 
  Elsewhere in the world, central banks acted as economic policy-
  makers and planners for the whole nation. United Kingdom banks on 
  the other hand did not acknowledge the need to be integrated with 
  industry. This led to the phenomenon of the "Stop-Go" cycle. As the 
  government sought to restrain balance of payments, it place restric-
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tions on domestic consumers' purchasing power by manipulating hire 
purchase rates, all of which disrupted and discouraged long-term 
investment programmes in the consumer durables industries . City 
and Merchant banks placed their main interest in trade and overseas 
investment, whilst industries were sacrificed, as always, to the altar of 
the City's financial system. 
A further cause of Britain's international decline was the fact that it 
did not exploit its strong position at the end of the Second World War. 
German and Japanese power had been greatly eroded whilst Britain 
stood as the victor. People in Britain had saved money during the war 
and in the first 10 years after 1945 the release of this pent-up demand 
made it very easy for producers to sell their products. They lacked the 
aggressive nationalism so vitally necessary to industrialists , whilst 
other countries, which were ruined during the war, worked hard to 
restore national pride in the form of fortifying their economy. British 
Industrialists were hostile to showing openness towards the foreign 
expertise that was emerging. There was no modernisation, nor 
thought for the future as they seemed content to rest on their laurels. 
It took until 1965 for an organisation providing expertise and indus-
trial capital to be created-the Confederation of British Industries 
(CBI). Once again Britain waited for a crisis before acting. 
The money that Britain did make in the post-war boom was not re-
invested in industries; in fact, general de-industrialisation occurred. 
For example, the National Health Service was created so that human 
suffering and deprivation of the interwar years would not be repeated 
at any cost. Although the N. H. S. was a phenomenal achievement in 
itself, this was no consolation to the industrial sector. Scarce in-
vestment resources were mis-allocated to research and developments,
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 which was an unproductive absorption of surplus at excessive levels 
 and took over 40% of all research scientists and engineers. In 1955 
 total research and development expenditure in the UK amounted to 
 187 million, the highest figure for any country in Western Europe, yet 
 63% of this total was spent on defense and less than one-third funded 
 by private industry. It was noticeable that Japan and West Germany, 
 who were denied the right to sustain a large national army, had the 
 most technically and competitively efficient economies. 
 Trades unions were also a cause of industrial retardation. The most 
 extreme criticism of British Trades Unions in comparison with foreign 
 counterparts is that they were politically motivated organisations, 
  prepared to use their considerable power to secure a privileged posi-
 tion in society. Until 1945 Unions had been mainly amongst craft 
  workers, but after 1945 the balance of class forces changed and Unions 
  emerged amongst semi-skilled workers in the new industries of en-
  gineering, vehicle construction and chemicals. Certainly UK exporters 
  and industrialists found it to their advantage to avoid conflict with 
  workers, hence redirected sales to new or protected markets rather 
  than compete, which, in the end, stifled economic growth. Again, it 
  must be stressed that the lack of competition amongst industrials in 
  the early post---war years also enhanced the strength of the Unions. 
  Abroad unions were less militant and disunited as they were usually 
  and internally, religiously or politically divided, whereas the British T. 
  U. C. was not. Foreign competitors concentrated on producing, not 
  quarrelling, hence Britain's profits were comparably eroded. Succes-
  sive governments found themselves unable to tackle Union strength 
  as they lacked the legal means to alter class practices at factory level 
  and because the Labour movement was willing to strike against the
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introduction of legal changes. 
On the management side there was an almost equal volume of criti -
cism. Brooking's Institution Study of the British Economy published 
in 1968 castigates British management for its poor overall quality . It 
lacked professionalism and qualifications due to nepotism and the 
extensive "Old Boys" network . 
It is not surprising, under the general spectrum of British decline, that 
Britain applied to join the E. E. C. Although political considerations 
were foremost in the mind of the government in 1961, Ministers were 
not neglectful of the economic benefit which would include economies 
of large-scale production, specialisation and an increase in industrial 
efficiency as a result of exposure to the vigours of international 
competition and general stimulation to growth due to close associa-
tion with a group of countries experiencing rapid economic expan-
sion. In fact it was a means of assuring that Britain would catch up 
with the West. 
The missed opportunities of the 1950's were difficult to recapture. 
Many industries were forced to collude which in itself was regressive 
to competitive growth. The struggle to maintain financial prestige in 
the City caused large-scale dis-investment which led to an absence of 
economic growth and hardened worker resistance. Sluggish markets 
meant that labour----saving techniques brought redundancies, which 
added to the crisis; low investment and high government expenditure 
resulted in inflation. What the UK economy needed during the 
1950's and 1960's was general restructuring and modernisation.
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 10. DISCUSS BRIEFLY THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF 
    THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM AND ACCOUNT
    FOR ITS COLLAPSE IN THE EARLY 1970'S.
By the end of the World War II it was clear that the international 
monetary system needed completely reorganising and that multilat-
eral trade needed to be re-established. To this end there were a 
number of discussions held in both Washington and London, between 
the U. S. and UK governments. The aim was to produce a set of rules 
or code of conduct for international monetary affairs. These talles 
culminated with an international conference held at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire in July 1944. 
It was at this conference that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
was set up and the idea of the Gold Exchange Standard was intro-
duced. The IMF was to be the organisation that had the job of 
creating the conditions, under which the transfer of goods from one 
country to another could take place unfettened by restrictions on 
trade or controls over international payments. The IMF had 3 main 
objectives. They were: 
  i) To extablish a multilateral system of payments based on world 
    wide convertibility of currencies. 
  ii) To establish exchange rate stability well competitive devalua-
    tions avoided 
iii) To allow member nations to pursue domestic policies such as 
    full employment without worrying about the exchange rate.
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In order to achieve these objectives the Gold Exchange Standard or 
Bretton Woods system was introduced. It was supposed to combine 
the best of both the old Gold Standard and free floating exchange 
rates. The dollar was given a face value against Gold of $ 35 per ounce. 
The currencies of other countries were then pegged against the dollar 
and therefore indirectly against gold. The dollar could only be 
converted into gold internationally and not domestically . The dollar 
was therefore as good as gold. There was also some flexibility . The 
exchange rates of countries could be pegged 1 % of their par value, 
and also the currencies were allowed to change in value but only by 
10%. If any higher a change was necessary permission had to be 
sought from the IMF . The dollar was therefore to be the key currency 
backed by Sterling. 
The IMF had a pool of funds made up of the currencies of all the 
member countries. The amount of currency each member country 
had to subscribe to the fund depended on the countries G. N. P. The 
amount of the countries subscription also decided it's voting quota on 
the IMF and how much it was allowed to withdraw from the pool. 
25% of the money subscribed was in the form of gold and 75% in the 
form of the countries own currency. In this way it was hoped that the 
pool would contain sufficient funds. The largest quotes and therefore 
the countries with the most power were the USA , India, France, and 
UK. If a country had a short run balance of payments deficits it was 
allowed to withdraw foreign currency from the IMF pool. The 
country was expected to surrender the equivalent value of its own 
currency and was also expected to repurchase it , in the near future, 
with either gold or a convertible currency . The maximum that was 
automatically allowed to be withdrawn was the equivalent of the
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 value of gold it had subscribed to the fund. If a currency became 
 scarce the fund had 2 options. The first option would be to either 
 exchange gold with the country or borrow the currency from a 
 member country. The second option was to declare the currency 
 scarce and use exchange controls to ration the currnency. These 
 measures would be continued until the surplus in the country was 
 controlled . These policies were only meant to be for short term 
 deficits and surpluses since it was assumed that over time, surpluses 
 would cancel out deficits. If this did not happen devaluation or 
 revaluation was accecptable with consultation with the IMF. 
 The Bretton Woods system did by no reasons get off to a good start. 
  Between 1945 and 1955 there was a severe shortage of dollars. The 
  problem was most acute between 1945 and 1948 when there was a 
  large trading gap between Europe and the USA. Dollars were needed 
  by Europe in order to buy much needed US goods, but it sold nothing 
  in order to pay for these goods. It was not until 1948 when the 
  Marshall plan was introduced that dollars became available. Marshall 
  aid was a gift from the Americans to Europe . Its main objective was 
  to keep the markets for its goods open by stopping any spread of 
  communism into Europe . It also allowed European countries to yet, 
  hold off much needed dollars . Without Marshal aid it would have 
  been impossible, for the IMF to cope with the situation. It, therefore, 
  took a back seat until 1955 . 
  It was not until 1958 that all W. European currencies were convertible 
  into dollars. The Bretton Woods system did not function fully there-
  fore until 1959. Its main period of operation was between 1959 and 
  1971. In 1958 however US exports fell dramatically and imports rose 
  slightly. This meant the trade balance was no longer sufficient to
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meet the needs of the huge amounts of external capital and military 
spending that the USA was commited to. The result was an outflow 
of gold from the USA. Although this loss was only $ 176 million from 
a total of $ 19.5 billion in 1959 it was the beginning of a rising trend 
that continued throughout the 1960's. The dollar problem had thus 
reversed by the end of the 1950's from a scarcity of dollars to a glut of 
dollars. 
This showed up the difference between the gold standard and the gold 
exchange standard . With the gold standard the UK's gold was 
convertible domestically, there was therefore an automatic constraint 
on the domestic money supply and thus the balance of payments of 
deficits. With the US system, there was no such constraint on the 
money supply since gold was not domestically convertible and in -
definate expansion was possible. In 1952 US liabilities passed reserves 
and by 1968 liabilities were more than 2 times greater than the gold 
and foreign currency reserves. In order for the US to continue to have 
balance of payments deficits, European banks were forced to hold 
dollars. As these holdings increased there became a conflict of in-
terests between Europe and the US. The countries which held dollars 
did not need them since they were the most economically strong and 
not so reliant on US goods. Dollars were therefore worthless to them. 
But countries short of dollars couldn't afford them. Unlike gold, the 
dollar was no longer an objective form of money. 
In the short term therefore the US was illiquid due to its high military 
spending, especially in Vietnam, and its high overseas investment. In 
the long run however its overseas assets were much greater than its 
debt. The US needed to cut back on its foreign investment or its 
military spending. The US was reluctant to do this because it feared it
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 might lose the markets it was exporting too and also its influence in 
 world affairs. 
 By the end of the 1960's a major international crisis was inevitable. 
 This was accelerated by the Vietnam War and the Keynesian policies 
 of the US which it pursued in order to achieve full employment. In 
 this it was very successfull and the US experienced its longest preiod 
 of growth in its history. Unfortunately it meant an increase in the 
 money supply and a rising budget deficit and this lead to inflation as 
 costs outstripped productivity. This inflation was transmitted to 
 other countries in the form of higher costs and interest rates. All this 
  put a great strain on the monetary system. The problems of the fixed 
  exchange rate were shown up as the system found out that had to 
  cope with countries inflating at different speeds. The deficits and 
  surplusses were also larger than the IMF could cope with. 
  The beginning of the end was in 1967  when the Sterling was forced to 
  devalue by 14% despite considerable efforts from the US and other 
  countries to try and prevent it from happening. Ever since 1957 
  Kenedy had been concerned with Sterling crisis as the Sterling had 
  been unable to fulfill its role as the second key currency. The UK's 
  major problem was that it wanted to maintain a similarly high role in 
  economic affairs as it had done in the past. Unfortunately its indus-
  tries were not strong enough to support overseas investments and 
  military expenditure that was required to achieve this status. These 
  problems led to the stop go cycle and deflation. This caused large UK 
  firms to divert funds overseas and this continued the decline in 
  Britains competitiveness. The US was desperate for the UK not to 
  devalue its currency. This was because if the sterling was devalued 
  there would be a lack of confidence in the system and consequently it
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 may break down. The Bretton Woods system was dependent on the 
 assumption that the key currencies were as good as gold . 
 The US's fears became reality the following year when the dollar 
 suffered a confidence crisis . As the dollar was the key currency it 
 could not use exchange rates as a weapon to influence the balance of 
 payments. Therefore in 1968 the price of gold rose to $ 40 per ounce 
 and by 1969, 46 countries had converted their dollars to  gold . By 1971 
 the US gold reserves had fallen from $ 17.8 billion in 1960 to $ 11 
 billion. At that rate of withdrawal it was calculated that with specu-
 lative acceleration there was only 5 years supply of gold . 
 Wherever there is a trade deficit in one country , it means there is a 
 surplus in another country. In this case the surplus was in Japan and 
 W. Germany. It was clear that equilibrium needed to be restored . 
 There were 4 ways of doing this. The first option was for countries 
 with surpluses to devalue their currencies , this was what was fa-
 voured by the US but neglected by these countries . The second option 
 was for the US to deflate , but this was not politically feasible with the 
 government going into an election. The third option was for the 
 countries with surpluses to take up expansionary policies , but this 
 was neglected by the inflation fearing Germans . The final option was 
 to use suppression methods such as tariffs and controls on the US 
deficit. This was however against the Bretton Woods rules . 
In order to get some action , the so called "Nixon shock" were intro-
duced in August 1971. First of all , gold price was raised effectively 
devaluing the dollar by 8 % in terms of gold . Secondly the dollar was 
made unconvertable and thirdly an import surcharge of 10% was 
introduced. These had the desired effect and exchange rates were 
adjusted mutilaterally with the Smithonian agreement on 18th De-
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 cember 1971. Great flexibility in the pegging margins was introduced 
 allowing differences of 2. 25% and the gold price rose from $ 35 to $ 38 
 an ounce. Unfortunately nobody believed the Smithonian agreement 
 would work. This led to lack of confidence which in turn led to a 
 speculative run on the dollar. 
 On June 23rd 1972, Britain floated the Sterling and all through 1972, 
  dollars relieve accumulated at an alarming rate in surplus countries. 
  The US tried to the downward pressure on the dollar by buying 
  dollars and selling D. M. through the foreign exchange markets. This 
  intervention continued until 1973, but to no avail. On the 12th of 
  February, 1973, the dollar was devaluated by 10% as the official price 
  of gold was raised from $ 38 to $ 42. 2 an ounce. This was virtually the 
  end of the Bretton Woods system, especially if they were in the ad-hoc 
  form of the 1971-72 readjustments. There then followed the European 
  scales where European Countries all floated their currencies relative 
  to gold. 
  Over the period of the Bretton Woods operation several weaknesses 
  were shown. The first was the difficulty of adjusting balance of 
  payment deficits when fixed exchange rates were in force. This was 
  especially true for the US dollar since it was the key currency and the 
  country could not use the exchange rate as the weapon to influence 
  the balance of payments. The second problem was preserving confi-
  dence in the key currencies when their economies were in difficulty. 
  The third problem was the large amount of money allowed to flow 
  from one center to another in the international capital market. This 
  led to distabilizing effect. Gold production also could not keep up 
  with its demand. This meant dollars were held and did not help world 
  liquidity. The reason for the gold shortage was that with its fixed
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 price it was umprofitable to mine it in certain areas . 
 The main criticism of the system however was its inability to f
orce 
 surplus countries to expand their economy in order to reduce th
eir 
 surplus. This was shown when Japan and W .  Germany refused to do 
 anything about their surplusses . The US was also unwilling to do 
 anything about its deficit and it was this lack of cooperation whi
ch 
 was the main reason for the collapse of the system . The IMF could 
 also have been blamed since it never even considered using the 
scarce 
 currency choice in order to force suplusses to be reduced
, and instead 
 prefered to lend the currency of the member country . The IMF was 
 also not prepared for the growth in the world economy and h
ad 
 insufficient funds to cope with the deficits that occurred . It had 
 proved itself capable of dealing with short term disequilibrium but 
 had not really kept countries to the rules of the monetary system
, as 
 many deliberately manipulated their obligations to the fund .
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11. DISCUSS THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
  OIL PRICE EXPLOSION OF 1973/74.
In October 1973, war broke out in the Middle East . The effects of the 
war put immense pressure on world economies
, and the "oil crisis" 
which ensued brought an end to the steady and long postwar boom
.
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 As Armstrong says, "The mini boom of 72/73 proved to be the final 
 and most feverish phase of the long post-war boon. The "oil crisis" of 
 winter 1973/74 and an internatonal crash in the summer of 1974 
 brought the golden year to an abrupt and painful halt." 
 Conflict in the Middle East bred solidarity among Arab oil states and 
 gave a new impetus to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
  Countries (OPEC). This was a cartel of the major non-US, oil pro-
  ducers, whose aim was to reduce the power of the big oil companies 
  and raise incomes of the member countries. In an attempt to reduce 
  support for Israel, OPEC announced a 10% across-the-board cut in oil 
  exports and a selective embargo, directed chiefly at the US. The oil 
  companies dutifully followed OPEC instruction to the latter. The 
  companies tended to do what they were told. The Saudis dictated, 
  controlled and ran the highest percentage of the OPEC markets. One 
  company even acceded to a Saudi request to provide information on 
  their supplies to the US military bases worldwide. 
  The selective embargo proved ineffective because the companies 
  transhipped oil from one destination to another, spreading the cut-
  backs equally. The reduction in supplies of some 5 million barrels a 
  day, or 9 % of non-Eastern block output caused few lasting problems. 
  But its effect on spot oil prices, which rose considerably, was used by 
  the producers to justify a general price rise. In the short term, demand 
  for oil appeared insensitive to changes in price so the world could do 
   nothing but accept them. 
   OPEC succeeded in imposing and maintaining a major increase: oil 
   prices quadrupled during the winter of 1973/74, raising the producers' 
   annual revenue by around $ 64 billion. 
   Some of the exporting countries would not instantly convert their
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 higher revenues into demand for Western industrial products
. This 
 resulted in their building up of substantial balance of payment
s 
 surpluses. In Western Europe and Japan , measures were taken at once 
 to narrow a yawning deficit in energy balances and to reduce de-
 pendence on OPEC countries. For instance, driving was banned on a 
 Sunday. Restrictive policies were introduced in all major countries in 
 1973 in response to the price acceleration of the mini boom and the 
large wage claims that were beginning to be submitted in its 
wake. 
Materials and food prices began to drift downward from the summ
er 
of 1973, but world inflation rose to an annual rate of 10% in the second 
half of the year as previous materials price rises fed through to the 
final goods markets. 
There were four developments in the early 1970's which led to the "oil 
crisis". The first was an acceleration of various rates of inflation on a 
world scale. Secondly there was a rapid increase in the dependence of 
the United States on imported oil due to declining domestic reserves
, 
and that is as well as a mismanagement of its own domestic energy 
affairs. The third point is that there was a shift of control in the oil 
industry of the Middle East from the hands of seven major interna-
tional companies to the governments of the exporting countries
. 
Lastly, and perhaps the most important is the implantation and 
expansion of Israel in the Middle East against bitter Arab opposition . 
The oil price rise worsened the conditions both for producing surplus 
and for realising it. It raised input costs, thereby tending to decrease 
profitability and intensifying the pressure on industries to raise prices 
because fixed capital could no longer be operated profitably at ex-
isting output prices. It also transferred, at a stroke, 1.5 of the world 
purchasing power to OPEC. The recipients did not, and in the short
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 run could not, spend the majority of their extra revenue, so world 
 demand fell. 
 Pressures were intensified still further by the introduction of yet more 
 restrictive policies. Monetary condition were further tightened in 
 most economies in the spring of 1974. Nevertheless, inflation rose for 
 some months, and production continued to grow in all major econo-
 mies except the US during the first half of 1974. The commodities 
  boom had increased many less developed countries' export earnings, 
  and import rose with some lag. The oil price rise reactivated the boom 
  in commodity prices and boosted inflation, which reached an annual 
  rate of 15% in the spring of 1974. 
 The war in the Middle East had prompted the OPEC to take such 
  actions. It is doubtfull if OPEC could have successfully imposed the 
  price increase at the time it did in the absence of the high levels of 
  demand that accompanied the mini boom. In addition, dollar deval-
  uations worked to encourage a rise in price, because most oil products 
  were priced in dollar which was being eroded in value. 
  OPEC would almost certainly have been unable to sustain massively 
  higher prices in the context of the subsequent crash had United States 
  policy toward oil imports not changed dramatically in the 1970's. 
  The price rise was a product of the boom in a more general and 
  fundamental sense. A tremendous increase in oil consumption which 
  accompanied the great burst of accumulation threatened to deplete 
  reserves. Some possible pessimistic view were expressed as to a 
  "depletion horizon", therefore a major price adjustment was needed to 
  encourage both energy-saving and exploration activities. 
  The impact of this crisis in 1973/74 varied considerably across indus-
  tries and countries. The bulk of industries faced higher costs and a
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 squeeze on profits whereas the major oil producers had a profit 
 bonanza. Returns on their operations rose from $ 3. 9 billion in 1972 to 
 12. 1 billion in 1974. Those on investments in OPEC increased from 
 $ 2. 6 billion to $ 6. 1 billion over the same period. 
 Although the majors oil producers enjoyed vastly improved profits 
 and the oil price rise appears more of a mixed blessing when viewed in 
 the context of other changes in the industry . The rise of OPEC 
 brought changes in ownership and operations as well as price. 
 Direct exports by OPEC national oil companies rose from a negligible 
 proportion of production within the  area to some 50-55% over the 
 course of the 1970's. Host government ownership of oil production in 
 OPEC rose from some 2 % in 1970 to 60% in 1974 and 80-90% in 1980. 
 By the end of the decade the major oil producers had secure ownership
 rights for crude oil only within the OECD area. Despite price boosts, 
 exploration and production, OECD oil output only rose by 1.3 million 
 barrels a day between 1973 and 1980. 
 Japan experienced a greatly increased import bill . The country had 
 no fossil fuels of her own , and thus there was a great drain on 
 domestic incomes. This increased her balance of payments con-
straints and reduced any room available for manoevre over domestic 
economic policies. For Japan, therefore, the "oil shock" was a major 
blow without mitigating benefits. For the United States, the crisis 
brought a completely different reaction. Its large oil reserves allowed 
it to be self sufficient in oil. It runs a two tier pricing system which 
allows the US domestic industries to gain a competitive advantage by 
purchasing oil well below world market prices. 
For a long time the US had known about reserves of shale oil and 
bituminous schists, which are other forms of fuel, but it just had not
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 been economically viable to extract them at pre-1974 prices. It was 
 the extraction of these which would make the US self-sufficient in oil 
 in the foreseeable future and would eliminate any dependence on 
 foreign reserve supplies, a problem which the Pentagon had started to 
  worry about. 
 So while the oil crisis caused major difficulties for the world systems 
 as a whole, its impact, like that of the commodity boom and the dollar 
 crisis was uneven. The US had suffered less than all of its major 
  rivals. 
 Post 1973/74, nuclear energy attracted much attention. By 1977, EEC 
 countries and Japan were importing less oil. Even during the eco-
  nomic revival which came at the end of the ` 70's, France and Italy were 
  still able to reduce their dependence on OPEC countries. 
 Oil still remains a central problem in international affairs. Most of the 
  world will almost surely demand on the Middle East for the greater 
  part of its supplies of oil. It is clear that the stability of such a heavy 
  dependence on such a limited base can only be ensured by extensive 
  international co--operation. OPEC tried to reduce the oligopolistic 
  power of the seven major companies and in many ways succeeded. 
  But at the same time the companies increased their profits quite 
  considerably. 
  OPEC is often cast as a super villain, holding the world economy to 
  ransom for political motives. The price rise came like a bolt from the 
  blue, damaging growth which had previously been performing well. 
  The "oil crisis" was the trigger for the crash and separates the period 
  of overheating from the subsequent one of mass unemployment and 
  stagnation.
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